Evaluating foreign-source dependencies in the U.S. Army's M1 Abrams tank by McDonald, Bradley Neal
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-06
Evaluating foreign-source dependencies in the U.S.
Army's M1 Abrams tank
McDonald, Bradley Neal
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31465




DEPENDENCIES IN THE U.S. ARMY'S 
Ml ABRAMS TANK 
by 
Bradley Neal McDonald 
June 1995 
Principal Advisor: Dave Matthews 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19960122 079 DTICQtFALm INSPECTED 1 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden (or this collection of information is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services. Directorate for information Operations and Reports 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204. Arlington. VA 22202-4302. and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188). Washington  DC 20503 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blink) 2. REPORT DATE 
'""» iQQs 
3. REPORT TYPE  AND DATES COVERED 
Mactpr'c Thgoic- 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
EVALUATING FOREIGN-SOURCE DEPENDENCIES IN THE U.S. 
ARMY'S Ml ABRAMS TANK 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
McDonald, Bradley N. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 




AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12*. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
The purpose of this thesis is to inform the acquisition community of the growing concerns related 
to foreign-source dependencies for parts and components of the United States Army's Ml Tank. The 
overall extent of foreign-source use in the production and support of the Ml tank are unknown, due to the 
lack of data. The Ml program management office has little awareness of the extent of foreign-source use 
in the weapon systems, particularly beyond the prime contractor and their immediate subcontractors. Failing 
to gain accurate and timely data concerning foreign-source dependencies at the sub-tier levels of production 
and support of the weapon systems, may present risks to the program. Failing to manage foreign-source 
dependencies can cause production stoppages in an emergency. Although there are directives and 
instructions to program managers indicating their responsibilities to monitor foreign-source dependencies 
within their weapon systems, there is little guidance and resources provided to conduct this task. The 
foreign-dependency issue was examined from the point of view of the Government, economists, and 
industry. Interviews of the PM, the prime contractor, and sub-tier producers were conducted. Proposed 
evaluation methodologies, foreign-dependency, and solutions were reviewed. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Weapon Systems, Manufacturer, GDLS, Foreign-Source Dependence 




18.   SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF THIS PAGE 
Unclassified 
19.   SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
82 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Form 298 (Rev  2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Sid 239-18 
298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
EVALUATING FOREIGN-SOURCE 
DEPENDENCIES IN THE U.S. ARMY'S 
Ml ABRAMS TANK 
Bradley Neal McDonald - Captain, United States Army 
B.B.A, McKendree College - Radcliff, 1990 
Author: 
Approved by: 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Accesion For 
NTIS    CRA&I 










Avail and /or 
Special 
Dave Matthews, Principal Advisor 
Mark W. Stone, Associate Advisor 




The purpose of this thesis is to inform the acquisition community of the 
growing concerns related to foreign-source dependencies for parts and components 
of the United States Army's Ml Tank. The overall extent of foreign-source use 
in the production and support of the Ml tank are unknown, due to the lack of data. 
The Ml program management office has little awareness of the extent of foreign- 
source use in the weapon systems, particularly beyond the prime contractor and 
their immediate subcontractors. Failing to gain accurate and timely data concerning 
foreign-source dependencies at the sub-tier levels of production and support of the 
weapon systems, may present risks to the program. Failing to manage foreign- 
source dependencies can cause production stoppages in an emergency. Although 
there are directives and instructions to program managers indicating their 
responsibilities to monitor foreign-source dependencies within their weapon 
systems, there is little guidance and resources provided to conduct this task. The 
foreign-dependency issue was examined from the point of view of the Government, 
economists, and industry. Interviews of the PM, the prime contractor, and sub-tier 
producers were conducted. Proposed evaluation methodologies, foreign- 
dependency, and solutions were reviewed. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to inform the acquisition community of the growing 
concerns regarding foreign-source dependence for parts and components of the Ml 
Abrams Tank. Additionally, this thesis investigates the location of the suppliers that 
support the prime contractor in the production and support of the weapon systems. An 
analysis is conducted to determine if any of the identified foreign-sources for the weapon 
systems pose a threat to the continued support and production of the Ml Tank. 
B. BACKGROUND 
For the last fifty years the United States, as leader and peacekeeper of the world, 
has evolved a defense industrial base that served to protect not only its own shores but 
also other areas of the world, most notably Europe. The resulting requirements meant 
high volume tank production which created a private sector dedicated to the defense 
business and a public sector comprised of twenty-four military depots to maintain the 
fleet.   [Ref. l:p. 4] 
The Abrams tank assembly line in Lima, Ohio, is the only operational tank factory 
in the United States. The last tank produced for the U.S. Army was completed March 
1993. As a result, General Dynamics Land Systems Inc., the prime contractor for the Ml 
tank series, is attempting to sustain this factory and their subcontractors through foreign 
military sales (FMS) and M1A1 tank conversions to M1A2.   [Ref. 2:p. 15] 
Department of Defense (DoD) officials have stated that during these changing 
times, domestic manufacturers should seek out suppliers based on factors other than 
location, such as cost, quality, performance, and delivery time. When these factors are 
considered, a domestic manufacturer may determine that a foreign supplier provides the 
greatest benefit.   [Ref. 3:p. 2] 
If domestic manufacturers continue to select foreign-based suppliers for production 
of parts and components instead of domestic producers, the contractors and the U.S. 
defense agencies accept certain risks to the manufacture and support of their weapon 
systems. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are to inform the acquisition community regarding the 
current levels of dependence on foreign-sources that are being utilized in the manufacture 
and support of the Abrams tank. Also in the conduct of this study, the methods for 
discovering, monitoring, and measuring the influences of the use of foreign-sources are 
explored to evaluate their efficiencies. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What parts and technologies utilized by the Ml Al Tank are currently being 
threatened by the increase in globalization of producers? 
2. Subsidiary 
* What determines if a part or technology is threatened, how is it identified, 
and who conducts the threat identification? 
* What causes a part or technology to become threatened? 
* Are current plans to mitigate risk of foreign dependence of Ml Al parts or 
technologies adequate for the current threat environment as identified by 
the National Military Strategy. 
* How does the current National Military Strategy allow for risk avoidance 
by utilizing the attributes of reconstitution. 
* How is the migration from domestic to globalization of parts production 
of the Ml Al Tank currently being monitored. 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The thrust of this thesis is to examine the current threat posed to the United States 
main battle tank by increased globalization of the defense industrial supply base. This 
study investigates what plans have been made to monitor the foreign dependence of the 
weapon systems and if these plans have been adjusted to accommodate the current threat 
described by the National Military Strategy. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used in this thesis includes a comprehensive literature 
review and personal and/or telephonic interviews with appropriate Army project 
management and readiness agency personnel. The telephonic and personal interviews are 
used to help define the processes utilized in defining critical parts or technologies and 
describe current plans for mitigating foreign-source dependency risks. 
G. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background and policy information was obtained from the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC)/Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) 
databases, the National Military Strategy, the National Security Strategy, professional 
journals, and published studies. Additional information was obtained by corresponding 
with the Army Material Command, the Office of the Program Executive Officer for 
Armor Systems Modernization, the Office of the Project Manager for the Abrams tank, 
the Office of Project Manager for the Ml Al tank, and representatives from both the prime 
and subcontractors of the Ml series tank. Analyses conducted by the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) and other Federal agencies were utilized to determine current 
and potential risks associated with an increasing globalization of the defense industries. 

II.  BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses the history of the defense industry and how it has been 
formed into its present condition.   There are several views of the historical perspective 
of how and why the U.S. defense industry is in its present condition. One fact is present 
in all theories on this subject; the U.S. defense industry as well as U.S. economy are both 
in decline.  Through a thorough search of present documentation one theme rings clear 
as to the number one cause for this decline: consumption has exceeded production in the 
U.S. by a minimum of 1 trillion dollars from 1980 to 1990. The first annual report to the 
President and Congress by the Competitiveness Policy Council points out that the United 
States increased its debt much faster over the last decade than it did to finance World War 
II.   [Ref. 4:p. 13] 
The only way a country can consume more than it produces is to import 
the difference from abroad. Nations with trade deficits are spending more 
than their incomes. They must be borrowing from the rest of the world or 
selling domestic or foreign assets. Conversely, nations with trade surpluses 
accumulate claims on others or reduce others' claims on them. [Ref. 5:p. 
516] 
During the 1980s the American trade deficit primarily resulted from the borrowing 
of funds from abroad by the U.S. Government to pay for its increasing budget deficits. 
In general, when the Government increases its borrowing, either the private sector must 
increase its lending, or the country as a whole, must borrow from abroad. For the private 
sector to lend more, it must save more. During the 1980s, the actual saving rate of the 
private sector within the U.S. declined. Consequently, the U.S. Government was forced 
to increase in overall borrowing from abroad and ultimately increasing the trade deficit. 
[Ref. 5:p. 516] 
The trade deficits alone are not inherently "bad." To illustrate, assume that a 
national firm desires to expand and selects your home town as the location to build a new 
multi-million dollar manufacturing plant. In order for this firm to build the manufacturing 
plant, they are required to borrow 30 million dollars. The firm petitions the city for the 
funds and projects that the plant will pay for itself within 25 years, plus employ several 
hundred local workers. The city managers reviewed the firm's proposal and determined 
that their community would be better off if the firm locates in their city. They 
determined that the firm will create income-earning assets that will aid in future 
repayment of any funds loaned to them for its creation, plus bring more wealth into the 
city. Initially, the firm created a deficit for themselves by consuming more than they 
produced, the loan of 30 million dollars. But ultimately the firm repaid the city and both 
entities gained by producing more than they consumed. This is an example of the positive 
use of a deficit.   [Ref. 5:p. 516] 
The U.S. trade deficit in the eighties however, reflected increased borrowing for 
consumption rather than investment. From 1980 through the early 1990s, gross national 
savings declined from 20% of Gross National Product (GNP) to 16% of GNP, reflecting 
a growth in the federal deficit (Government dissaving), a decline in state and municipal 
surpluses, and a fall in private household and business savings.   [Ref. 6:p. 201] 
Over the same period, the consumption and savings patterns of our major 
economic rivals, Germany and Japan, have been in many ways the mirror image, with 
production exceeding consumption by $954 billion, generating trade surpluses of the same 
magnitude. Their savings rates, meanwhile, have maintained an average of 23% and 32% 
of GNP, respectively. In the process, Europeans and Japanese have been compensating 
for some of the decline in American savings by doing it for us, reaching a high in the late 
1980s of supplying approximately half of all our domestic investment. [Ref. 6:pp. 202- 
226] 
With the public realization of the growing National deficit, the Congress and 
current the administration began attempting to reduce U.S. Government consumption. 
Some believe that the burden of military spending has been the chief cause of America's 
relative decline. But this argument presumes that if the United States had not spent as 
much on defense, it would have used the funds saved from defense spending for 
technological improvements and domestic investment.   [Ref. 5:p. 516] 
To reinforce the public's perceptions of excessive military spending, Congressional 
leaders as well as the current administration point to the reduced threat to National 
interests throughout the world, as originally portrayed in Les Aspin's report, "The Bottom- 
Up Review:  Forces For A New Era." 
The Cold War is behind us. The Soviet Union is no longer. The threat 
that drove our defense decision-making for four and a half decades - that 
determined our strategy and tactics, our doctrine, the size and shape of our 
forces the design of our weapons, and the size of our defense budgets ~ 
is gone.   [Ref. 7:p. 1] 
With the end of the Cold War, the National leadership has been attempting to 
capitalize on this perceived reduced need for military forces by cutting the Department 
of Defense's budget and increasing U.S. domestic investment. Economists refer to the 
transfer of funds from the defense sector to the domestic sector, directly following the 
successful culmination of a war, as the "peace dividend." 
Following World War II, the peace dividend was effectively channeled into capital 
assets of the manufacturers that supported the war effort. Several leading economists have 
stipulated that even with a shift of resources away from military spending, the decline in 
relative economic performance will persist so long as the "peace dividend," itself, is not 
invested in productive uses. Investments, such as, health care for the elderly or poor, are 
not classified as productive uses. Productive uses are capital investments, such as 
investments in plant and equipment.   [Ref. 8:pp. 8-9] 
The structure of the defense industry is the result of an historical evolution, which 
in some cases has been going on for several decades. A study of this history indicates 
significant features, all leading directly to many of the current problems. 
1. Extremely cyclical nature of defense procurements. 
2. Lack of structural planning, (the mix between Government and privately- 
owned manufacturing plants). 
3. Inadequacy of industrial-preparedness planning. 
4. Importance of technology and defense research. 
5. High concentration within industrial sectors (Each rapid buildup and rapid 
sell-off has increased the concentration of the share of the business in a 
few large firms). 
A.        ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Other problems which contribute to the decline in the current defense industrial 
base: 
* At the prime-contractor level 
- unhealthy financial conditions 
- aging plants and equipment 
- excess capacity 
- high cost of weapon systems 
* At the lower tiers 
- diminishing number of sources 
- growing foreign dependency 
- development of bottlenecks  [Ref. 9:p. 240] 
1. Extremely Cyclical Nature of Defense Procurements 
Following World War II, the public's perception was that the last great war had 
been fought. It was perceived that defense production and Government procurements 
needed to be reduced. 
Within five years following the war, 115 billion dollars was granted by the U.S. 
Government to private industry to assist in a transformation from producing weapons to 
producing civilian goods.   [Ref. 10:p. 8] 
This grant represented a true peace dividend which was effectively derived without 
levying additional taxes or increasing the national deficit. This effective re-capitalization 
of industry from the peace dividend increased industry capacity by 40 percent. [Ref. 10:p. 
8] 
With the industrial base being dominated by largely commercial industries at the 
advent of the Korean War, a controversy arose regarding which industries would accept 
the defense contracts over commercial interests. The commercial industries were unsure 
of the extent of the growing American involvement, the perceived duration of the conflict, 
and the political attitudes of the time. The President signed the Defense Production Act 
of 1950 which accelerated defense production over commercial needs and provided 
guaranteed Government loans for production and modernization of newly-converted 
defense facilities.   [Ref. 10:p. 10] 
Following the conclusion of the Korean War, there was another down-turn in 
Government procurements and a subsequent build-up for the Vietnam Conflict. The 
periods of large increases in defense expenditures followed by dramatic reductions, led 
to the breakup of the defense industrial base. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the 
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[Ref. 10:p. 11] 
2.        The Lack of Structural Planning 
The structure of the defense industrial base is made up of three principle levels; 
the material level, the subcontractor level, and the prime contractor level. [Ref. 9:p. 241] 
The material level is composed of firms which provide raw materials, parts, and 
sub-components for the next higher level of the manufacturing. Some of these firms are 
small and concentrate their efforts in providing only one part or sub-component for a 
specific weapon systems.   [Ref. 9:p. 241] 
The next level in the defense industrial structure is the subcontractor. Generally, 
the subcontractor receives and combines parts and materials from the material producer 
level and provides components for the prime contractor's manufacturing operations. [Ref. 
9:p. 241] 
The final level within the defense industrial structure is the prime contractor. The 
prime contractor usually retains a contractual obligation to the military service for 
production and delivery of the particular weapon systems. The prime contractor generally 
receives components from the subcontractors and assembles them to produce the final 
product, the weapon systems.   [Ref. 11 :p. 22-3] 
The lack of structural planning within the defense industrial base indicates that 
there is no definitive plan for which, if any, of these levels within the industrial base 
should be occupied by a Government financed production firm. The DoD has not 
constructed a structural framework to produce or sustain the weapon systems for the 
defense of our nation. The following describes some of the hazards inherent within 
DoD's current acquisition system stemming from the lack of a Government structural 
planning. For example, the military service provides the defense industry with a 
requirements document, in the form of a request for proposal (RFP), which outlines a 
specific need for the development of a particular weapon systems. Once the prime 
contractor receives this information they develop a preliminary plan for the production of 
the weapon.   [Ref. 11 :p. 4-3] 
To ensure their success, the prime contractors seek collaboration for production 
of the system from their known subcontractors. It is through these collaborative efforts 
that the production and support structure will be formed for a particular weapon systems. 
[Ref. 1] 
It is primarily the prime contractor who searches the U.S. defense industrial base 
for vendors who are willing and capable of producing specific materials and components 
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which make-up the total weapon systems. The military service has never established a 
structural plan for identifying the material producers and subcontractors. This has 
provided them an opportunity to use subcontractors to develop their own structure. The 
prime contractor may form a structure of multiple subcontractors who produce and 
assemble over 50% of the system.   [Ref. 9:p. 258] 
Using subcontractors in this manner allows for possible reduced governmental 
oversight. 
Just as the Government has issued standard clauses for all its prime 
contractors, so too, most of these prime contractors will, in turn, issue their 
own standard subcontract clauses. But, since there are multiple prime 
contractors, there are variations in their terms and conditions, depending 
on the specific desires and interests of the prime contractor who issued 
them. 
[T]the Government contract clauses which are mandatorily required to 
"flow-down" to a subcontractor sometimes need not be passed down 
verbatim. Therefore, a prime contractor could propose modified 
mandatory flow-down clauses which secure more or varying rights for the 
prime (perhaps at the subcontractor's expense) as long as the minimum 
governmental requirements remain in effect. The Contracting Officer will 
normally not be concerned about the clauses that a prime contractor 
attempts to impose on his subcontractor....  [Ref. ll:p. 22-3] 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contains a uniform set of procurement 
regulations which govern all governmental contracting. Most subcontractors and material 
producers are not responsible for reporting to any military service agency. It is the prime 
contractor who is selected by the service to develop and produce on schedule a product 
for the particular military service. It is the prime contractor who selects the subcontractor 
and material producers and it is their responsibility to develop an adequate supporting 
structure. 
In defense of the military services, it must be noted that throughout the acquisition 
cycle of a particular weapon systems, a great deal of planning and program review is 
conducted by governmental officials to ensure that the Government gets a quality system 
at the best possible price. Also, during the initial phases of a major weapons system's 
development, a defense industrial base analysis is conducted to determine if the 
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capabilities are present within the industry to produce the system. Plus, during the early 
phases of competitive development and production, the contracting military service is 
knowledgeable of the majority of the contributors to the system's production. 
While questioning program managers of presently existing mature weapon systems, 
concerning the locations and possible impacts of their subcontractors and material 
producers, none expressed any knowledge of their status. And, none of the program 
managers questioned had any present knowledge of the solvency or national origin of the 
subcontractors or material producers.   [Refs. 12 and 13] 
The basic economic laws of supply and demand also effect the defense industry. 
If the Government chooses to purchase fewer weapon systems, there will be fewer 
subcontractors and material producers. As the defense budgets continue to decrease, the 
defense industrial base will also proportionally decrease.   [Ref. 9:p. 261] 
When a large defense prime contractors begin to feel the pinch of dwindling 
defense acquisition dollars, they notify the Government or governmental military Service 
directly. In an interview with the public relations representative of General Dynamics 
Land Systems (GDLS), he revealed that he and his associates held a conference in 
Washington D.C. to discuss future funding for tank production. He stated that current 
yearly production of 120 U.S. produced tanks and the production of 120 tanks for foreign 
military sales (FMS) would sustain the current industrial base, anything less would force 
32% of their key suppliers to leave the market and a dramatic increase in production 
costs. When asked why GDLS conducted the meeting in Washington, D.C, he replied 
that the decisions are made in Washington and we wanted to inform the decision makers 
of possible problems in the continued production and support of the M1A1/M1A2 series 
tank.   [Ref. 1] 
When subcontractors or material producers feel the pinch of reduced acquisition 
dollars, they notify the prime contractor. Within the tank industrial base, GDLS monitors 
the solvency and location of the subcontractors and material producers. At the prime 
contractor level, it is GDLS who determines when to consider a product critical. 
According to GDLS, when they discover that one of their critical producers is beginning 
to encounter insolvency problems, they send representatives to the subcontractors location 
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to assist them in overcoming their obstacles. If the subcontractor or material producer 
cannot overcome their problems, GDLS finds a substitute or replacement producer. Very 
seldom in this rehabilitative/replacement process is it required for GDLS to notify or 
request permission from the Government to take action.   [Ref. 1] 
If the changes in the sub-tier producers are one tier away from the prime 
contractor, such as below the subcontractor level, the Government has little or no visibility 
in their replacement or substitution. The subcontractor may scour the world for the best 
deal in providing a replacement without Government restrictions such as The Buy 
American Act, or other governmental provisions contained within prime contractor's 
contractual obligations. 
Because of the lack of structural planning from the Government within the defense 
industry, the services have reduced control and decreased visibility of who is producing 
what for a particular weapons system. Reduced funding of the military budget may 
unknowingly force a highly specialized U.S. material producer out of business, only to 
be replaced by their foreign based competition. Because of the lack of present structural 
planning, the military services must place tremendous trust and confidence on the 
capabilities of the prime contractor to provide an uninterrupted supply and support for the 
Nation's weapon systems. 
3.        Inadequacy of Industrial-Preparedness Planning 
Historically, when conflicts developed, there had been an absence of peacetime 
planning to adequately confront the crises.   [Ref. 9:p. 241] 
a. World War II 
Prior to World War II, the U.S. possessed an abundance of raw materials 
plus an extensive industrial infrastructure. [Ref. 15:p. 11] At the outbreak of war, the 
Army was composed of 200,000 men and 1800 planes. Many of the planes were 
considered obsolete. [Ref. 16:p. 49] Public support for the war activities were positive 
and contributed dramatically to the successful conversion of industries from the civilian 
to defense production. As a result, the defense industrial base produced prodigious 
amounts of weapon systems to be employed in the war effort. In one month, March 
1944, the defense firms produced 9,114 military aircraft.   [Ref. 10:p. 8] 
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Prior to 1940, the average rate of industrial output increase was 4 percent 
per year, whereas, during the period of 1940 - 1944 it was 300 percent. [Ref. 16:p. 65] 
Prior to 1940, production of a merchant vessel required thirty-five weeks. By 1943 the 
production time diminished to seven weeks.   [Ref. 16:p. 186] 
Reviewing the above information suggests that the U.S. was not prepared 
for war production at the outset of hostilities in WW II, but made a successful 
transformation within adequate time to successfully resolve the crisis. There were several 
factors that made this transformation possible which pertain to this thesis. First, prior to 
the mobilization for WW II, the U.S. was in support of its allies' war effort in Europe and 
was moving towards partial mobilization. Second, in 1941 the U.S. did not accept or 
require foreign support for weapon systems. 
b.        The Vietnam Conflict 
In contrast to World War II, the Vietnam Conflict appears totally different. 
During World War II the Nation mobilized its efforts in support of the war effort. During 
the Vietnam Conflict, the Nation did not undergo complete mobilization. Public opinion 
did not fully support the war effort and manufacturers displayed reluctance to convert 
their profitable civilian manufacturing plants to defense production. The manufacturers' 
reasoning was that their plants were currently operating at close to full capacity and the 
defense contracts were insufficient in quantity to justify their conversion to military 
production.   [Ref. 17:p. 186] 
The defense industrial base prior to Vietnam, exhibited a shortage of 
suppliers.   The ball bearing industry is representative of the industrial base supplier 
groups.   During this period there were three domestic ball bearing producers.   The 
following quote from a Joint Logistics Review Board demonstrates the severity of the 
condition of the ball bearing industry during the first years of the Vietnam War. 
...of these, [ball bearing industries], one just became sales agent for a 
Japanese manufacturer, one is operating at a loss, and one is vacating the 
market through diversification. Continuing this trend, U.S. aircraft and 
missiles will soon become dependent on factories that are located on 
foreign soil and are not necessarily dependable in the event of hostilities. 
[Ref.l7:p. 120] 
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Unlike WWII, the Vietnam Conflict did not obtain a high level of support 
from the existing administration or industry. During Vietnam, the military procurements 
had to compete with private consumption. The following is testimony given by General 
(Ret) Miley of the Army Material Command before the House Armed Services Committee 
concerning military procurements during the Vietnam War: 
In the Vietnam War, planning agreements with planned producers were not 
exercised. In most cases competitive solicitations were issued and 
contracts negotiated and awarded before production was initiated. Since 
solicitations were not limited to planned producers, except in a few 
instances, contracts were awarded on the basis of price to firms which were 
not qualified, in many cases, by experience or capacity to produce. As a 
result, long production delays were experienced.   [Ref. 19:p. 423] 
Reviewing the preparations for World War II and the Vietnam War 
indicates a trend.  When there is considerable positive public support and national unity 
in favor of the war effort, the U.S. industrial base has been willing to expeditiously 
convert from civilian commercial production to production of military equipment.   But 
during times of limited involvement, such as the Vietnam Conflict, the U.S. industrial 
base has displayed a measured response in their conversion from civilian production to 
military production.    Examining both situations, WWII and the Vietnam Conflict, it 
appears that the greater the public support for a war effort, the more freely firms within 
the industrial base convert to military production. But, during limited U.S. involvement, 
private industries must receive increased incentives to convert their production efforts or 
remain in production of military equipment. 
4.        Importance of Technology and Defense Research 
Technology development and defense research are expensive and time-consuming. 
Prior to World War II, Research and development (R&D) expenditures for both industry 
and Government were approximately $1 billion per year. However, in the 40 years after 
the end of World War II, investment in R&D grew to almost $100 billion per year. 
Approximately half of this R&D is Government-sponsored. By 1985, the DoD alone was 
spending over $30 billion per year for R&D on defense systems.   [Ref. 20:p. 215] 
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In 1984 total federal R&D expenditures were $44.2 billion, of which $29.3 
billion went for national defense (66%). [for comparison] The next largest 
item was $4.8 billion for health, followed by $2.6 billion for energy and 
$2.3 billion for space.... This represented a dramatic buildup in defense 
R&D, from $13.6 billion in FY 1980 to $31.3 billion in FY 1985. [Ref. 
20: p. 374] 
The current trend of R&D spending for the military is revealed in the Draft 1994 
National Military Strategy. The below mentioned excerpts from the Draft 1994 National 
Military Strategy, are presented to highlight that DoD intends to continue a trend of 
technological advances in future weapon's procurement. 
We intend to remain the best equipped force in the world. Modernization 
programs preserve the essential combat edge that U.S. forces now 
possess.... We intend to continue our programs to improve sensor-to- 
shooter links using the most modern technologies.... Major programs 
involving significant investment are being undertaken.... Add-on 
modernization of existing platforms will be continued to take advantage of 
rapid technological change.   [Ref. 21:pp. 13, 16] 
In direct opposition to the National Military Strategy is The Military Reform 
Group. This is an organization that opposes continued investment for technological force 
advancements. This group's strategy in providing weapons for the defense of the Nation 
is not to continue research and development (R&D) and technical improvement of the 
current systems, but to provide more of what the military is currently using. This group 
believes in greater numbers and less technological advancement.   [Ref. 21: p. 13] 
Following the logic of the Military Reform Group, it seems unusual that the 
military would abandon weapon systems which are finally made to work and invest 
billions into experimental research. By investing a large portion of the DoD budget into 
R&D and the use of advanced technology to achieve maximum performance in each 
weapon, it has encouraged industrial management to focus its attention on new systems 
under development, rather than on those in current production or already deployed. [Ref. 
22:pp. 225-260] 
The advocates of quantity note that in World War II the United States "never had 
a tank that was good as a German tank, but we had lots more." [Ref. 20:p. 42] The 
advocates of quality argue that there is no way that the U.S. can catch up with the 
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overwhelming quantities of the Soviet equipment so "we must make one of ours better 
than three of theirs." [Ref. 20:p. 42] These views indicate the beginning of our current 
National Security Strategy. 
Hence, the National Security Strategy as well an the National Military Strategy 
both encourage technological improvement. It has been documented that DoD allocates 
funds for continuous product improvement. In a previous section within this thesis it was 
noted, that current program managers of developing systems commonly know the majority 
of contributors for the production of their systems. Within the current acquisition cycle, 
the majority of governmental documentation and systems review revolve around the 
product conception, the initial development, and the initial production. It is this 
dedication to advancing systems which allows for less emphasis to be placed on existing 
systems. Once the weapon systems are in full production or when production is 
completed, the Government's visibility of the material producers and supporting 
subcontractors begins to become limited.    [Ref. 28] 
There are faults with following either The Military Reform Group's or the 
National Military Strategy's ideals to an extreme. Following the strategy of The Military 
Reform Group, the program manager's main mission would be to insure production and 
support of existing weapon systems. While this would provide for adequate support and 
increased visibility of the production at all levels within the defense industrial base, it 
would not hasten the advancement of life saving, technologically advanced weapon 
systems. Weapons such as the Patriot, which was very instrumental in protecting the lives 
of American service men during the Persian Gulf War, would have not been developed 
if we strictly adhered to the Military Reform Group's strategy. But if DoD continues to 
spend proportionally more resources towards weapon systems innovation with a decreasing 
defense budget, sustainment of present systems will receive proportionally less attention. 
But the ever increasing complexities in producing highly technical weapon systems 
requires highly specialized producers. As demonstrated in the support of the weapon 
systems during the Vietnam Conflict, many of the systems that needed support required 
experienced and qualified producers. The extent of qualifications, required for production, 
increases the number and time of production delays.   It appears that the more complex 
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a production process is, the longer it will take to manufacture production equipment, train 
employees in the operation of that equipment, and ultimately get the weapon systems in 
the hands of the soldiers.   [Ref. 9:p. 264] 
In the future, because of continued DoD budget reductions, it will not be possible 
to provide the same level of financial provisions for either R&D or support for current 
weapon systems.   Decision makers must make a choice as to which to adequately fund, 
either current weapons or R&D.   This thesis contends that the present leadership is 
primarily focused on the development and production of technologically advanced weapon 
systems and not on the continued support of present weapon systems. And because of the 
current leadership's position, they have dangerously neglected to monitor who is providing 
the support for the United States Army's main battle tank and make determinations if the 
support for this weapon systems will be adequate in a time of crisis. 
5.        The High Concentration Within Industrial Sector 
The rapid expansion of defense industries at the beginning of hostilities and the 
rapid liquidation of these industries following the end of a war has increased the 
concentration of the share of the business in a few large firms. 
During World War II, $26 billion was invested in new plants and 
equipment.... The lion's share went to the large firms. Thus, when the 
war ended and these facilities were sold [by the Government to large prime 
contractors] (at attractive prices), it was not surprising that 250 of the 
nation's largest firms acquired more than 70% of the plants sold. [Ref. 
20:p. 379] 
The defense industry also is concentrated into the top 100 firms conducting 75 
percent of the business. This ratio has been in effect since the late 1950s. These 
industries become extremely concentrated when they specialize in providing the specific 
weapon systems, such as a tank or missile.   [Ref. 20:p. 245] 
Combined with specialization, the defense industry results in high levels of 
concentration because of the sporadic buying habits of DoD. Historically, DoD procures 
a new weapon systems of a certain type once every 10 to 15 years. The procurement 
contract for the new system usually goes to one prime contractor, which results in higher 
concentration ratios for selected weapon areas than are found in the typical commercial 
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sectors.   The following is a list of percentages of business conducted in the military 
market by the top four firms: 
surveillance satellites 100% 
nuclear submarines 99% 
space boosters 97% 
fighter aircraft 97% 
attack aircraft 97% 
missile inertial guidance systems 97% 
aircraft inertial navigation systems 96% 
missile reentry vehicles 95% 
aircraft fire-control systems 95% 
helicopters 93% 
jet aircraft engines 93% 
[Ref. 9:p. 246] 
Adding to the problem of concentration, is the growing concern about the viability 
of the large defense firms in a shrinking defense market. During the 1970s and early 
1980s, it was identified that the defense industry was moving into decline. Numerous 
studies indicated that the contractors' investment in new manufacturing equipment and 
technologies were only about half the rate of comparable commercial firms. In 1977 and 
again in 1987, the Government shifted to a new profit policy that allowed higher profits 
for those firms that made capital investments. A follow-up study conducted by the Air 
Force determined that while defense industry profits had increased, their level of capital 
investment remained minimal.   [Ref. 9:p. 251] 
6.        Problems at the Subcontractor Levels 
The defense industry is basically a dual economy, with an upper level [the large 
defense contractors] and a lower level [the subcontractors and part suppliers]. The two 
levels differ in many respects. The large defense contractors or prime contractors conduct 
business directly with Government representatives. The subcontractors deal primarily with 
the requests placed by prime contractors. The majority of regulations passed down from 
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Congress directly  effect the prime  contractors and may  be passed  down to  the 
subcontractors through contractual requirements.   [Ref. 9:p. 257] 
Typically, between 40 and 60 percent of the dollar value of a weapon systems is 
subcontracted by the prime contractor to smaller firms or parts producers. Small inventor- 
lead firms have made many of the qualitative breakthroughs in military technology. 
Historically, DoD has not been overly concerned about the dependence on subcontractor 
innovation and technology but, has primarily depended on the prime contractor to ensure 
continued product viability. Governmental and prime contractor's concerns have been 
realized through the drastic reduction in subcontractors, from 6000 to 300 in the aerospace 
industry alone.   [Ref. 9:p. 258] 
Through the reduction in the number of suppliers, many of the remaining suppliers 
are now operating at or near full capacity. Thus, an increase in demand due to a defer 
build-up or crisis could cause substantial backlogs and bottlenecks within the system. The 
following is an example of what may happen in the future if we depend heavily on a 
prime contractor's ability to project and provide surge capabilities. 
In 1974 Congress authorized a doubling of tank production to replace the 
tanks the U.S. had given to Israel, which had lost almost all its tanks in the 
1973 war. The sole plant producing the M-60 tank had a large amount of 
excess capacity and had assured the Army that increasing the production 
of tanks rapidly, should it ever be required, would not be difficult. 
However, over a period of years the Army had gradually forced the 
reduction of armor-casting subcontract firms to a single source (due to the 
reduced quantities of M-60s procured in the post-Vietnam era), and that 
plant was operating at close to full capacity. Thus, when the orders 
doubled, all the casting supplier could do was try harder. Costs increased 
significantly, and it was a long time before the armor castings, and 
eventually the tanks, could be produced in increased quantities. 
Unfortunately, this is a typical case. Surge capability (including extra 
capital equipment) was built in at the prime-contractor level, but at the 
lower level there was neither sufficient capacity nor competition. Thus, 
both the benefits of peacetime competitive efficiencies and benefits of 
wartime surge capability were totally lost. Perhaps most surprising, the 
DoD had failed to notice the problem.   [Ref. 9:p. 259] 
Few suppliers remain in the lower tiers of the defense industry and they are highly 
specialized.  The specialization of the firms in defense subcontracting means that DoD 
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loses the economies of scale that could be realized by combining defense and non-defense 
production. 
Along with specialization comes foreign support for niche markets not currently 
occupied by U.S. producers.  Recent studies indicate several markets that are crucial to 
the production and support of the military's latest sophisticated weaponry are supported 
by offshore subcontractors. Four key technological areas exhibit a trend toward exclusive 
offshore suppliers.   These trends raise concerns about circumstances in which the U.S. 
might become vulnerable. 
Individual system studies found such trends in: micro-electronic device 
production, including packaging, assembly, and fabrication of both discrete 
and microcircuits; advanced materials, including ceramic packaging and 
gallium arsenide; production equipment, including machine tools and 
lithography equipment; and flat panel display technology.   [Ref. 14:p. 9] 
To put these dependencies into perspective, studies indicate that the majority of 
today's modern weapon systems require at least one of the above four key technologies. 
Of the four dependencies listed, three of them relate directly to two types of devices: 
discrete devices and integrated circuits (IC). A discrete device is an electrical component, 
such as a resistor or transistor, which performs a single independent function. The IC, 
however, is an electrical network, active or passive, composed of two or more circuit 
elements interconnected to perform an electronic circuit function.   [Ref. 14:p. B-II-17] 
Integrated circuits and discrete devices have become critical to military 
applications. Semiconductors are the brains of the U.S. high technology weaponry. 
Electronic components enhance a system's capability and allow the U.S. to maintain 
significant technological superiority and a credible conventional deterrent over our 
adversaries. 
Figure 2 displays the process for production of discrete and microcircuits. In 
reviewing the process, note the lithography function. This function is an integral part of 
the manufacturing process. During this phase the circuit is projected on to the surface of 
a micro-thin slice of silicon. To obtain reliability and quality, the process must be 
uniform to exacting standards. Cannon and Nikon, both Japanese companies, are the 
largest producers of this type of equipment. Nikon alone produces 500 units per year, 
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whereas, the largest U.S. producer, General Signal, produces 60 units.  An Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA) study concluded: 
The international market for lithography is at a critical threshold. While 
Japanese industry is pursuing actively both optical and X-ray approaches 
using research consortia and guided by a national goal, U.S. lithography 
equipment companies are struggling to stay in business. Failure to meet 
this challenge would be substantial disadvantage for U.S lithography 
equipment suppliers and semiconductor manufacturers. [Ref. 14:p. B-II- 
20] 
In 1989, the then Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recom- 
mended that the IDA investigate Aircraft Radar: the APG-66 and APG-68. These radars 
are used in all U.S. and most foreign F-16s. These radars are considered among the most 
successful fire control radars in the world. DARPA recommended that IDA investigate 
these radars to determine the extent of U.S. foreign-source dependence in their production. 
DARPA also wanted IDA to use these radars because they believed that they would be 
representative of the microelectronic technologies used in the majority of contemporary 
weapons. [Ref. 14:p. 4] Figure 3 indicates their findings and the location of the 
microelectronic producers. 
Of the key technological areas that exhibit a trend toward exclusive offshore 
suppliers, the fourth is machine tools. Machine tools are required to cut metal to a 
prescribed specification. High quality machine tools hold better tolerances and offer 
greater manufacturing repeatability. Repeatability assists greatly in predicting and 
sustaining reliability. Military personnel depend heavily on the reliability of their 
equipment.  [Ref. 14:p. B-IV-14] 
According to the engineering staffs at leading U.S. heavy equipment manufacturing 
firms, foreign suppliers now dominate the U.S. market for high-end machine tools. U.S. 
companies remaining in business to produce machine tools are heavily dependent on 
foreign-sources for technology and parts. They can no longer procure from a domestic 
source the microcircuits and dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) that go into the 
machine controllers.   [Ref. 14:p. B-IV-14] 
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Figure 3.       Sources of Packaging/Assembly Materials 
[Ref. 14:B-II-24] 
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B.        SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter identified five features of the defense industrial base 
which could cause problems of weapon systems production and support. First, the 
cyclical nature of defense procurements, where the U.S. Government increases 
procurements during war time mobilization followed by drastically reducing procurements 
during peace time. It was shown that the large defense contractors withstand these 
fluctuations better than the supporting subcontractors and material producers. It is during 
the down-turn in defense procurements that many small and less prepared firms leave the 
defense business in pursuit of a more stable and profitable sector of the economy. 
Second, the lack of structural planning, [the mix between Government and privately- 
owned producers] is not determined or considered during the systems acquisition process. 
These two factors constitute a major dysfunction within the systems acquisition 
process. Because of these two factors, firms which support the weapons acquisition 
process, enter into National support only for the duration of the war effort when 
participation is mandatory. Then following the conclusion of the crisis, when production 
quantities and profits are reduced, they leave the defense sector. 
During periods of limited involvement, such as operations other than war, it is not 
mandatory for firms to participate in the production of weapon systems. Also, during 
these same periods of limited involvement and reduced defense procurements, it may not 
always be profitable to produce small amounts of specialized weapon systems, so 
production firms may choose to leave the defense sector in pursuit of a more profitable 
sector of the economy. Because of these two factors alone, it is apparent that DoD must 
monitor the viability and production capabilities of the firms that support the structural 
foundation for defense weapon systems production. 
Third, it was demonstrated that in 1973 the production capabilities of the support 
base were inadequate to support a minor surge in production capabilities for the 
production of M60 tanks. DoD had provided surge capabilities within the production 
plant for the M60 tank, but had failed to ensure that the subcontractor and material 
producer support was adequate. It is this thesis' contention that if the present tank 
industrial base was called upon, to produce similar numbers of tanks, within a limited 
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time-frame,  that the current prime contractor would have the same problems as 
demonstrated in 1973. 
Fourth, because of perseverance of the current leadership in DoD, the majority of 
our acquisition efforts revolve around the procurement of developing systems. Because 
of their focus, they fail to monitor the continued globalization of support for current 
weapon systems within the subcontractor and material producer levels. 
Fifth, the high concentration of few producers within the defense industrial sector 
limits competition and places increased power within the hands of few capable prime 
contractors. When the subcontractors and material producers begin to leave the defense 
industrial base, because of lack of structural planning and the cyclical nature of defense 
procurements, it is the powerful prime contractor who negotiates and provides DoD with 
a viable substitute producer. Because it is the prime contractor who locates the producers, 
the knowledge of the location of the actual production of the parts and technologies for 
the total weapon systems is not always considered by the military service customer. The 
following chapter will investigate the extent of the knowledge of the military service for 
production of parts and technologies. 
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HI.    ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE 
This chapter identifies how and DoD monitors foreign-source dependence. This 
chapter reviews and evaluates the most current studies of the U.S. military's foreign 
dependence of parts and technologies. A review of these studies will assist in determining 
the methodology and completeness of current DoD attempts to detect and monitor the 
present foreign dependence of the U.S. military. These studies also are utilized by the 
author to provide criteria for defining what is considered to be foreign-source of 
production, how to determine foreign dependency, and how parts and technologies are 
defined to be critical for the continued support of U.S. military weapon systems. 
The DoD Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-maior Defense Acquisition Programs, 
and DoD Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Program Procedures serve as an 
instruction guide for program managers. The directive and instruction require program 
managers to analyze the capability of the U.S. industrial base to meet production 
requirements for weapon systems, including surge and mobilization requirements. These 
documents also require an assessment of the capabilities of the U.S. defense industrial 
base to include consideration of foreign-sourcing and dependency.   [Ref. 23 :p. 5-E-2] 
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicates that, although there 
are directives and instructions to program managers indicating their responsibilities to 
monitor the supportability of their programs, there is little or no specific guidance on how 
to accomplish this task. The GAO report also expressed concern about whether program 
managers, without assistance, could effectively assess the capabilities of the U.S. defense 
industrial base, including the risks inherent in foreign-sourcing, to produce their weapon 
systems.   [Ref. 24: pp. 24, 25] 
The following definitions were formulated through the use of the studies contained 
within this chapter. They are presented here to assist in the understanding of those 
studies. 
Critical: A part or technology is defined as critical if its absence does not allow 
the weapon systems to perform its intended mission. 
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Foreign: The term "foreign" corresponds to production facilities located out-side 
of the continental borders of the United States. 
Foreign Dependence: Foreign dependence or foreign-source dependence occurs 
when there is a limited number of producers and the majority of them reside outside of 
the continental borders of the U.S. 
Risk: This thesis contends that if 100% of all assets required for production and 
sustainment of all weapon systems for the defense of the National interests is not 
produced within the U.S. continental boundaries, that U.S. interests, as well as DoD 
interests, except some level of risk. Assessing whether the U.S. dependence on a foreign- 
source for a particular military item entails a substantial national security risk requires 
answering two questions. First, how critical is the item to various national security needs? 
And second, how great is the likelihood that the U.S. will not have access to the item or 
technology when needed? 
To narrow the set of DoD purchases and militarily relevant technologies to a group 
most likely to entail unacceptable risk, a measure or screen can be used. Screening for 
criticality to the defense mission is the first step in identifying potential risks. 
Concerned that DoD has not established criteria for determining acceptable levels 
of dependence of foreign-sources, the GAO requested their National Security and 
International Affairs Division review and submit a proposed framework for evaluating the 
national security risks associated with the purchasing of military products and technologies 
from foreign-sources.  [Ref. 24 :p. 1] 
Table 1 shows the risk factors identified by GAO's internal National Security and 
International Affairs Division. The factors are listed in four categories; the first one 




- The importance of the item or technology to the specific weapon systems and the overall defense mission. 
- Stockpiling potential, the ability to stockpile adequate amounts of product. 
- Technical substitution possibilities - the existence of feasible technical substitutes or the ability to 
develop them in an acceptable time frame. 
- Linkages to other goods, industries, or technologies in terms of industrial or technological spill-overs from domestic 
production that could affect the nation's ability to compete in other important areas. 
- In the case of technologically sophisticated goods, the degree to which the technology is considered mature as 
opposed to fast moving. 
Disruption  
- Distance from source, in terms of required shipping time. 
- Location of engineering and manufacturing facilities, if different from assembly and shipping facilities. 
- Transportation exposure. 
- Risk of natural disturbances interrupting supply. 
- Political stability of supplying country or region, including political and diplomatic ties to the United 
States. 
- The Country's economic stability in terms of foreign debt, exchange rate control, labor strife, or other 
factors. 
- Trade stability — potential for the supplier's own supply from another country to be interrupted. 
- Country's internal business environment, such as the nature of the regulatory environment. 
- Supplying firm's economic stability. 
Availability of alternative supply sources 
- Supply concentration-the extent to which a few sources worldwide control the production of goods or distribution 
of technology. 
- Dual-use options, or potential availability of the same or similar goods from a commercial supplier. 
- Scale effects on U.S. industry — the potential negative impact of decreased purchases from U.S. firms. 
- The potential for a U.S. industry to be reconstituted if lost. 
Adequacy of surge capabilities  
- The ability to acquire additional units of goods from an existing supplier during a crisis. 
- The timely availability of additional units of goods from other suppliers during a crisis. 
Table I. GAO Report on Criticality 
[Ref. 24:p. 21] 
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GAO selected a team of experts from industry and Government. This team was 
chartered to determine methods for defining critical parts and technologies. They were 
also to present ideas and a possible framework for assessing risks associated with 
dependence of foreign-source parts and technologies of current military weapon systems. 
The National Security and International Affairs Division submitted four possible 
frameworks for DoD adoption. A wire diagram of the framework and a brief description 
of each process is submitted. Following the description of the proposed processes, a 
cumulative analysis is submitted to identify their major differences, strengths, and 
weaknesses. 
A.       THE ANALYTIC SCIENCE CORPORATION 
The Analytic Science Corporation (TASC) is a $295M applied information 
technology company specializing in the development and integration of advanced 
information systems and services. Founded in 1966, TASC has over 2,200 employees, 
and offices in 24 locations in both the United States and the United Kingdom. 
TASC is the largest of the parent company Primark's three information services 
companies, and is the "technology engine" that supports all parts of Primark. TASC has 
had twenty-eight years of consecutive growth, and is well positioned to capitalize on the 
revolution in information systems and services that is underway as a result of the 
emergence of the Information Superhighway, proliferation of multimedia and accelerating 
changes in computing technology.   [Ref. 25] 
TASC conducted a study of the foreign vulnerability of critical industries. In this 
study, they propose measures to distinguish between foreign dependencies that pose little 




TASC defines foreign-source as "the purchase of goods, services, or technologies 
from outside the United States or Canada."   [Ref. 24:p. 23] 
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TASC states that foreign-sourcing is pervasive and a part of DoD's normal way 
of doing business and an important way of obtaining the highest quality goods and 
services for DoD. It may or may not lead to a condition of foreign dependence or 
vulnerability that requires monitoring or action by DoD. 
Foreign Dependency 
TASC defines foreign dependency as "a situation where goods and services are 
purchased from a foreign-source of supply with no adequate alternative source or 
substitute within the United States or Canada."   [Ref. 24:p. 23] 
Foreign Vulnerability 
TASC defines foreign vulnerability as "a situation where a foreign dependency 
exists and national security could be threatened by a disruption in supply. In many cases, 
a few firms in foreign countries can control access to state-of-the-art parts, components, 
processes, and technologies."   [Ref. 24:p. 23] 
Initial Screening 
The initial screening process suggested by TASC begins with a qualitative analysis 
of an item's criticality to national security based on a number of considerations. First, 
a review of historical information compiled by TASC and agencies of DoD. Second, a 
review of items listed within the Defense Manufacturing Board's Task Force report on 
critical industries. 
TASC's specific factors perceived to contribute to the criticality of an industry or 
technology include: 
Its ability to be reconstituted once lost; the ease with which the know-how 
embodied in an industry can be defused; the rate of technological change 
and research and development expenditures; linkages between one industry 
and another; spill-over effects in which the loss of one capability would 
damage or lead to the loss of others; and industry structure, which permits 
or precludes the entry of alternative suppliers. Additional criticality factors 
considered included geographical location, various types of liability (e.g., 
political, financial condition, and diversity of sources), and the ability to 
stockpile and substitute items.  [Ref. 24 :p. 24] 
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Dependence/Vulnerability Assessment 
Once criticality has been established, the authors of the TASC study perform a 
quantitative assessment of the vulnerability based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), a measure of the number of firms and distribution of market shares among them 
in a well-defined market. The HHI serves as an indicator for the potential for effective 
collusive activity on the part of foreign nations to deny the U.S. access to products and 
services. The HHI for an industry is calculated by summing the squares of the market 
shares of individual firms in a selected market. Squaring market shares emphasizes the 
relative power of firms in a market. The TASC study distinguishes firms with an HHI 
of 1000 or less to be relatively secure and the likelihood of disruption through collusive 
action is low. On the other hand, a firm with an HHI of over 1800, with no prominent 
U.S. or Canadian producers, would be considered as vulnerable. A score of 1800 or 
higher indicates a high concentration of market power and a possibility of collusion by 
current suppliers and could restrict the potential access by new suppliers. 
Once an HHI figure is placed on a firm in a particular market, the authors conduct 
a statical assessment based on three different measures. First, a geographical irkbx which 
is calculated by grouping shares by nation of origin. Second, a foreign dependence index 
is calculated by grouping international producers' shares of the U.S. market. Third, the 
entry barrier index, which is, derived from international firms' international market shares. 
These indices measure the U.S. vulnerability to the denial of critical parts by individual 
foreign nations, the extent of U.S. dependence on foreign nations, and the extent to which 
production of a commodity is concentrated in only a few firms worldwide. 
B.       INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS 
The IDA is a federally funded, independent, nonprofit, research and development 
center that focuses on national security and defense. It conducts research, systems 
evaluation, and policy analysis for DoD and other agencies.   [Ref. 26 :p. 583] 
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Qualitativ« analysis 
• Defense crltlcallty criteria used as Alter to establish vulnerability. 
• Criteria derived (rom previous research. 
• Identities potential candidates lor action. 
e Industrial controllers, numerically controlled machining centers, 
and electronic test equipment meet criteria (as examples). 
Quantitativ« analysis 
Determines degree of foreign source vulnerability. 
Uses Herflndahl-Hirschman Index (measures access to 
competitive markets) as example methodology. 
Based on published survey data. 
Results modified by other qualitative factors. 
Policy options 
•   Specific actions fcr government and Industry. 
Figure 4.        TASC Framework for Assessing Risk of Foreign-sourcing 




The IDA study did not use the term foreign-sourcing, but considered any item or 
technology provided by a firm whose ownership was not U.S. derived as foreign. IDA 
considered U.S. owned firms whose production plants which resided outside of the 
continental U.S. borders to retain some level of risk associated with similar firms which 
were not U.S. owned. IDA also placed limited levels of risk on production facilities 
contained within the U.S. borders but whose ownership was primarily foreign. The only 
firms considered not foreign were firms whose production facilities resided within the 
continental borders of the U.S. and ownership was also primarily domestic. 
Foreign Dependency 
IDA considered foreign dependence as context-specific, in that a key consideration 
was the ability of the U.S. to obtain alternative suppliers when necessary. 
Initial Screening 
The IDA study elicited expert opinions in a systematic manner, usually involving 
iterative questionnaires administered to individual experts with feedback of results 
accompanying each iteration of the questionnaire. DARPA also provided IDA a criteria 
which stressed the selection of systems that would be representative of critical technology 
areas, cover technology currently used in important defense systems and would play 
important roles in the future, and included systems procured by different armed services. 
Dependence/Vulnerability Assessment 
IDA identifies foreign dependency through an investigative process. Initially IDA, 
through the guidance from DARPA and expert sources, identifies an end product, such 
as an aircraft, tank, or missile. Then, IDA investigates that system's six product levels 
(system, subsystem, component, element, material, and raw material) in search of foreign 
suppliers. 
Once a determination is made that a foreign supplier is being used, IDA 
investigates to determine if any agreements, plans, or alternate sources have been 
established by the manufacturer.   If the manufacturer is using a sole-source foreign 
34 
supplier, as defined by IDA, then a level of risk is placed on the manufacture of the 
system being produced. 
Once the foreign-source is identified, IDA works with the system producer to 
determine the level of influence the foreign supplied product has on the manufactured 
system's performance. It has been determined that the level of risk and vulnerability 
associated with that of foreign dependence is directly related to the level of influence 
exhibited by the foreign product on the total system effectiveness. The greater degree of 
influence exhibited by the foreign product on the system's performance or effectiveness, 
the greater the risk and vulnerability to the system. 
IDA has formulated twenty-six vulnerability factors to assist them in determining 
varying degrees of risk. The broad categories of the vulnerability factors are: location, 
political-military, economic-commercial, supply and technology, procurements and 
program-control. 
The IDA study did not pursue an investigation of the identified alternate 
suppliers/sources to determine if in fact they could produce the required parts or 
technologies. By not investigating the alternate suppliers, the conclusions may not be as 
accurate as portrayed.   [Ref. 27 :p.   1] 
C.        NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 
The National Defense University (NDU) was established by DoD on January 1976. 
NDU's mission is to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in 
essential elements of National security. 
The university conducts short and long range studies of National security policy, 
military strategy, and the allocation and management of resources for national security. 
A goal of the university research is to create a National repository of expertise on 
mobilization, military strategy, and joint or combined policy and plans.  [Ref. 26:p. 268] 
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DA'a methodology 1 
Select systems 
• Repräsentativ« of crttteaJ technology «mat. 
• Currently used technology wtth significant rat« In future. 
• Procured by dfferent services. 
Cokect data 
• Known foreign lourcaa and contract terms. 
• Identify foreign part», equipment, or prooaaaaa used. 
• Why foralgn »ourcfng used. 
• Importanca of forelgn-sourced Kam, procaaa, or equipment. 
• Difficulties encountered ff foralgn «ourdng Is Interrupted. 
e Cost, obstacles, and delay* for domestic sources. 
• Military standards wfcfch affect system. 
Analyze data 
• Determine technology 
areas In which US. 
depends on foreign 
technology. 
Figure 5.       IDA Framework for Assessing Risk of Foreign-sourcing 




Any source of supply, manufacture, or technology outside the United States or 
Canada. 
Foreign Dependency 
Any source of supply, manufacture, or technology outside the United States or 
Canada for which there is no immediately available alternative source in the United 
States or Canada. 
Foreign Vulnerability 
Any source of supply, manufacture, or technology outside the United States or 
Canada for which there is no immediately available source and whose lack of reliability 
and substitutability jeopardizes national security by potentially precluding the production, 
or significantly reducing the capability of a critical weapon systems.   [Ref. 28:p. iv] 
Dependence/Vulnerability Assessment 
This study examines the circumstances under which a foreign dependency might 
become a vulnerability. It develops a framework for determining priorities to deal with 
the foreign vulnerability issue. This study uses case study format indicating areas of 
foreign dependency which might evolve into a vulnerability for National security. This 
study states that not everything that is sourced abroad, nor everything that the U.S. may 
be foreign dependent upon, should be considered as a foreign vulnerability. 
This study considers foreign vulnerability as a subset of all items sourced off- 
shore. The NDU distinguishes foreign dependency from vulnerability, by defining 
vulnerability as, "those dependencies demanding action." [Ref. 28:p. 3] This study 
considers three categories of where the U.S. may become vulnerable: surge capability, 
mobilization capabilities, and the technology base. 
Surge Vulnerability is the accelerated production, maintenance, and repair 
of selected critical items to sustain conflict and/or equip the active force. 
A surge foreign vulnerability exists when a foreign dependency has a high 
probability of preventing this rapid increase in the given time-frame by 
precluding production...thus causing those systems that are fielded to be 
less effective than required. 
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Mobilization Vulnerability is related to either full or total mobilization 
and involves: 1) a period from 12 months to years (the duration of the 
conflict), and 2) the production of the total range of weapons and 
supporting systems to conduct a conflict. A vulnerability exists if there is 
a high probability that the production of key weapons and supporting 
systems, or a range of systems, will be prevented or slowed, thus 
jeopardizing the capability of the United States to support its national 
defense objectives. 
Technology Base Vulnerability The United States has periodically 
expressed concerns over the possibility of a technological surprise by the 
Soviet Union that would drastically alter the military balance. Thus the 
technology base vulnerability concern is not over orderliness of the 
production, but over access to the most advanced technology for 
development and production of weapons.   [Ref. 28:p. 6] 
First, the NDU study selected various scenarios, levels of threat, time-urgency, 
alternatives, and unfilled requests as their criteria for the level of military system 
production. Second, they prioritized these types of systems required for various scenarios, 
to determine which systems will be required first. As an example, they selected precision 
guided missiles as their number one priority followed by ammo, spares, weapon systems 
platforms, and Strategic Systems. 
Following scenario and weapon selections, NDU analyzed the production require- 
ments of their number one selected weapon for a given scenario. They estimated how 
many of the particular weapon systems would be required to conduct a small conflict, 
allied support, and U.S. theater conflicts. They calculated the production and support 
levels required to sustain these operations from historical experience. 
Once the production and support levels were determined, they investigated who 
were the producers and where they were located. They estimated the possibility of 
disruption in supply for those items produced off-shore during periods of peacetime, 
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^H          MB 
Figure 6.        NDU Framework for Assessing Risk of Foreign-sourcing 
[Ref. 24:p. 35] 
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D.       THEODORE MORAN 
Theodore H. Moran is a Karl F. Landegger Professor and Director of the 
Program International Business Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University. Dr. Moran is also Professor and member of the 
Executive Council, Georgetown School of Business Administration. 
Professor Moran has taught at Harvard, Vanderbilt, the Paul H. Nitze 
School of advance International Studies, and the Colorado School of 
Mines. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard in 1971. 
Since then he has been a consultant to corporations, Governments, and 
multilateral agencies on investment strategy, international negotiations, and 
political risk assessment. 
In addition to some fifty scholarly articles, he has published nine books.... 
[Ref. 29:p. 99] 
Definitions: 
Foreign-Source 
A foreign-source includes any firm or industry outside the United States, Canada, 
and ~ with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Act- Mexico. [Ref. 
19:p. 43] 
Foreign Dependence 
Moran does not specifically define foreign dependence. He states that foreign 
dependence is not a public policy issue unless suppliers are concentrated. [Ref. 29:p. 44] 
Foreign Vulnerability 
Moran stipulates that a foreign vulnerability is defined by the concentration rule 
of 4/4/50. This rule states that a vulnerability will exist when either four foreign firms 
or foreign countries control 50 percent or more of a particular market. [Ref. 29:pp. 46, 
68] 
Dependence/Vulnerability Assessment 
Moran does not seek to define critical parts or technologies. He does however, 
advocate the implementation of the 4/4/50 rule to determine concentration as an initial 
means of screening for vulnerability.   [Ref. 24: p. 43] 
He argues that while strictly determining the concentration of supply is the most 
important factor in the process, the breakout between foreign and domestic suppliers 
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should also be considered. Moran believes that the U.S. should not depend on political 
arrangements. He believes that a greater extent of concentration is acceptable if the 
suppliers are primarily domestic, although reliance on a large number of foreign suppliers 
is preferable to reliance on a small number of domestic suppliers.   [Ref. 24: p. 44] 
Moran indicated that promoting cutting-edge technologies is the first step toward 
achieving a goal of protecting the defense industrial base from foreign dependence. He 
advocates the use of Government funds for innovation. He also explains that the funds 
for innovation should be weighted toward military-use-only technologies. His reasoning 
is that, dual use technology development mainly benefits the producer and not DoD. He 
explains that the majority of dual use technologies would be produced anyway by private 
funding (where there is a market need, private industry will provide).  [Ref. 24:p. 44] 
If a vulnerability is identified through the use of the 4/4/50 rule and the U.S. 
national interest becomes at risk, then the domestic industry must be assisted. He suggests 
quick implementation of a tariff on the foreign importing industry/industries. [Ref. 24 :p. 
44] 
Finally, Moran believes in monitoring and regulating foreign acquisitions and 
foreign investment within the United States. Moran notes that foreign direct investment 
can be considered a penetration of the defense industrial base and that acquisition of a 
U.S. defense company by a foreigner can represent a loss to the base.   [Ref. 24:p. 45] 
E.        STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS 
The Analytic Science Corporation's framework and process to identify foreign 
dependencies can be characterized as statistical process. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
provides a quantitative measure of risk. 
Strengths 
The HHI is a quantifiable. The index provides a number for each market 
segment. The numbers will provide an indicator of which areas should be 
studied more closely. 
If the users of the HHI accurately select correct assumptions, the index will 





Do (our or les* countries or (our or 
less companies control 50 percent 
or more of supply? 
Policy options 
Take appropriate action 
Figure 7.        Moran's Framework for Assessing Risk of Foreign-Sourcing 
[Ref. 24:p. 42] 
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HHI is an accepted device currently being used by the Justice Department 
and Federal Trade Commission. 
Weaknesses 
The HHI could be costly and time consuming. The data required to 
perform the HHI analysis comes from published sources as well as industry 
surveys. The cost and difficulty of obtaining the data depends on the 
definition of the market (narrow or broad) and the availability of 
information on that particular segment. 
Selection of incorrect assumptions can provide an easily defendable 
incorrect risk assessment. Too broad an industry definition (e.g., micro- 
electronics) would provide little insight into DoD's vulnerability in critical 
product areas. 
The Institute for Defense Analysis's framework and process to identify foreign 
dependencies can be described as a systems approach. This study investigates the foreign 
dependencies within a specific weapon systems. 
Strengths 
This study identified actual foreign dependencies within weapon systems 
currently being deployed. 
This framework allows for accurate evidence of foreign dependence. 
Because this framework focuses on the actual weapon systems, the authors 
could trace the production of parts and components from the prime 
contractor, who assembles the total weapon systems, to sub-tier parts 
suppliers. The authors produced factual data of current foreign dependence 
within a currently deployed weapon systems. 
This framework allows for quick analysis. The IDA study took three 
months and twenty investigators to examine nine components from four 
weapon systems. 
Weaknesses 
Identifying current dependencies is similar to twenty-twenty hindsight. By 
identifying weapon systems that are currently foreign dependent only 
suggests a problem after any opportunity to preclude it. It does not 
provide any alarms or indicators for what may happen in the future. 
43 
The National Defense University's framework and process to identify foreign 
dependencies, can be described as a scenario approach. NDU first calculated the number 
of weapon systems required to operate within a specific scenario, such as, to counter an 
army the size of Iraq. After determining this number, then made estimates of the 
manufacturing capabilities required to produce the determined quantity. This approach 
is currently being used by DoD to determine U.S. troop strength. 
The then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, formulated The Bottom-Up Review: 
Forces For A New Era. It was in this document that he calculated the number and 
composition of U.S. forces to support and defend our National interests. He believed that 
in planning future force structure and allocating resources, that we should establish force 
levels and support which should enable us to win one Major Regional Conflict (MRC). 
It appears that the NDU authors took the MRC building blocks and estimated what it 
would take to support one MRC in different scenarios.   [Ref. 30:p. 10] 
Strengths 
This approach provides a basis for estimating the number of systems 
required for selected scenario. These numbers allow planners an 
opportunity to investigate possible requirements for manufacturing capacity 
under peacetime, mobilization, and surge for a specific weapon systems. 
This is one of the first studies to consider the possibility of limited nuclear 
war. The other studies considered in this thesis never suggest that supply 
may be cut off by nuclear devastation. 
Weaknesses 
This study does not provide hard evidence of foreign-source vulnerability. 
The study does suggest that some weapon systems contain integrated- 
circuits produced off shore that may be vulnerable during certain 
circumstances. 
Theodore Moran's approach to determining foreign dependency, should be 
described as a national economic evaluation. Moran begins his essay by introducing the 
idea that U.S. economic mismanagement of economic policy is placing the U.S. in danger. 
The identified dangers are: loss of crucial economic and technological capabilities within 
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our own country, the growing dependence on foreign goods, services, and technologies 
that are vital to our national well being. 
Strengths 
Moran provides an analysis of the total economic picture for the United 
States. Foreign dependencies that were mentioned in other studies are also 
discussed within his essay. The difference between his identification 
within his essay and the other studies is that, he provides the basis for the 
dependency's beginnings coupled with projections for the future. He 
provides an all knowing, all seeing approach to economic ramifications of 
foreign dependencies. 
He does not just provides an opinion, he supports his position fully with 
relevant facts. 
He provides methods to manage dependency through the 4/4/50 rule. 
Using this rule is quick, accurate, and proven by Moran to be beneficial. 
Forward-looking approach to foreign dependence management. Moran 
suggests that all segments of the economy and the industries within those 
segments constantly monitor, investigate, and remain informed of their 
position within the world market. Currently, one of the biggest problems 
within U.S. industries is their lack of knowledge of their competitors. This 
lack of knowledge allows foreign competition to by-pass domestic industry 
without conflict. 
Weaknesses 
It would take an act of Congress to implement the majority to Moran's 
policies to reduce foreign dependence. 
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IV.    DETERMINATION OF RISK OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE 
The studies documented in Chapter III of this thesis provided four different 
methodologies for identifying foreign dependency risks. First, The Analytic Science 
Corporation (TASC) determined a level of risk through identifying critical parts and 
technologies, then assessed their vulnerability to foreign dependence through mathematical 
computations. Second, the Institute for Defense Analysis determined a level of risk 
through identifying critical parts and technologies, then utilized twenty-six vulnerability 
factors to evaluate their foreign-source dependence. Third, the National Defense 
University selected a scenario in which the U.S. military could be deployed, then 
determined a level of risk of foreign dependence through examining the manufacturing 
capabilities and locations of high priority (critical) weapon systems demanded for the 
identified scenario. Fourth, Moran identified a level of risk of foreign dependence 
through the use of identification of foreign based suppliers and the limit of alternate 
suppliers within the world. Moran, through the use of the 4-4-50 rule, established an 
unacceptable level of concentration of suppliers that produce critical parts and 
technologies for the U.S. military weapon systems. 
Chapter IV of this thesis investigates the foreign dependence of parts used for the 
production of the Ml Al tank. Utilizing selective investigative procedures from the 
previously documented studies, this chapter investigates what parts of the Ml Al tank are 
considered critical, then determines if any of these parts are being produced by a small 
number of foreign producers. Also, this chapter investigates the procedures for 
monitoring which firms produce selected parts of the Ml tank weapon systems. 
First, this thesis determines which parts of the Ml tank are considered critical. To 
assist in this, interviews were conducted with the program managers office and the prime 
contractor. These two groups were asked to provide which parts of the Ml tank they 
considered critical and how they managed these parts. These groups were also asked to 
provide information to assist in the determination of the location and ownership of the 
critical parts producers. This information provides the essential information required to 
determine if the critical parts of the Ml tank are foreign dependent. 
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A.   THE OFFICE OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER 
To determine which parts are considered critical, interviews were conducted with 
representatives of the Ml tank program manager's office. The program manager (PM) 
is primarily responsible for the weapon systems acquisition and support. Within the broad 
definition of the PM's duties and responsibilities the DoD Instruction 5000.2 lists 
numerous specific responsibilities of this position. Part 5, Section E, Industrial Base, of 
the DoD Instruction 5000.2 states, 
Foreign Dependencies and Diminishing Sources 
Plans will include procedures to identify and minimize potential foreign 
dependencies and diminishing manufacturing sources and material 
shortages. If such item/materials must be used, the plans must describe 
actions to ensure the availability of the items/materials during production 
and support and, as applicable, under surge and mobilization conditions. 
[Ref. 23: p. 5-E-2] 
The above instructions require plans to be made to monitor and predict the 
influence of foreign-sources on the production and support of military weapon systems. 
The office of the PM is responsible for constructing these plans. Interviews conducted 
with the Ml tanks PM's office, questioned whether is determined and what actions are 
currently being undertaken to avoid undue risk to the continued support of the weapon 
systems.   [Ref. 13] 
Selected representatives of the PM's office were questioned to determine the 
procedures for classifying a part or technology to be critical. Their procedures for this 
type of classification were determined to be similar to the procedures of the organizational 
units selection of the parts listed on the Parts Logistics List (PLL). 
A unit's PLL consists of replacement parts. The leadership of the armor battalions 
perform an informal trade-off analysis to determine which parts should be included into 
the PLL list. Usually the parts selected at the battalion level for inclusion to the PLL are 
the parts which break the most. [Ref. 31] In comparison, the PM's office conducts 
informal meetings to consider parts for special attention. The parts selected for special 
attention may consequently be the parts with a high demand history, but are usually parts 
from producers which have a demonstrated poor delivery record or the PM's office is 
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directly responsible for providing the part to the prime contractor or maintenance depot 
for production.   [Ref. 12] 
Representatives of the PM's office were asked if they considered the parts listed 
for special attention to be critical. They responded that all of the parts of the Ml tank 
could be considered critical, it depends on whom is asked. The PM's office was provided 
the definition of critical from Chapter III of this thesis, which states that for a part to be 
considered critical, its absence does not allow the weapon systems to perform its intended 
mission. Then the PM's office was asked if the parts on the special attention list were 
considered critical in accordance with this definition. The PM's office explained that 
most parts on their list should be considered critical, but to differentiate between which 
ones are and which ones are not would be a matter of personal opinion. There is not 
presently a list of critical parts of the Ml tank produced by the PM's office.   [Ref. 12] 
When questioned as to which parts are most closely monitored within the PM's 
office, they listed the government furnished parts, which are produced by a subcontractor 
specifically for the Government then, delivered to the prime contractor for inclusion into 
the Ml tank weapon systems. The representatives of the PM's office stated that the 
problems created by not insuring that Government furnished parts were at their designated 
place at the designated time, were considered tremendous. All facets of Government 
furnished parts are extensively monitored.   [Ref. 13] 
When questioned how certain parts are selected for special attention, they stated 
that the program manager along with a staff of logistics personnel conduct periodic 
informal meetings. During these meetings all logistical problems for the support of the 
Ml tanks are discussed. This group makes an informal analysis to determine what parts 
should be considered for special attention. Their primary concern in the selection of a 
part to be monitored is the continuation of uninterrupted supply. The PM attempts to 
insure that the weapon systems in the armor units, as well as those in production, receive 
continuous logistics support.   [Ref. 13] 
The PMs office was asked to provide a list of all foreign manufacturers and the 
parts they produce.  They stated that three parts are foreign-sourced. 
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[1]       Optics in the gunner's primary sight 
[2]       The ammunition storage racks 
[3]       The microcircuits in the ballistic computer — a component of the 
target acquisition/fire control system [Ref. 12] 
When asked the reasons for the foreign acquisitions and if these parts constituted 
a foreign dependency they explained that most of the optical glass in the gunner's primary 
sight is foreign produced. Low cost is the reason they stated, that the majority of these 
types of optics are produced in Germany and there is no domestic producer who could 
produce the same high quality optic at the same low price.   [Ref. 12] 
When asked if the supply of optics from this foreign-source was interrupted, would 
it cause serious problems in the support of the Ml tank fleet, they responded, that foreign- 
sourcing of these types of optics by the domestic industry appears to be widespread, 
therefore, loss of these foreign-sources would likely create an increased demand for optics 
from domestic producers. If domestic manufacturers cannot meet this broader and more 
intense demand, the Ml tank fleet could possibly be affected. Although, since current 
tank production is limited to the conversion efforts of the Ml tanks being upgraded to 
M1A2, the effects of the loss of the foreign-sourced optics producer would be minimal 
to the present fleet. The present Ml fleet has the optics in place. Once the sights are 
installed in the tanks they rarely require replacement.  [Ref. 12] 
When questioned about the use of foreign-sources for the microcircuits in the 
ballistic computer, they explained that, the ballistic computer used in the Ml tank is built 
by Computing Devices Company of Canada (CDCC). This firm utilizes some off-shore 
agencies for the assembly and testing of particular microcircuits. They stated that 
representatives of CDCC could conduct the testing and assembly in their domestic plant 
if economic considerations were deemed secondary. However, if the microcircuits were 
mandated to be domestically produced, the CDCC representatives estimated that 
production could begin to within a year depending on the particular microcircuit. [Ref. 
12] 
When asked to explain the use of a foreign-source for the ammunition storage 
racks they explained that, GDLS currently has a sole-source contract with Wegmann and 
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Company, a German firm, for the production of the storage racks. In 1987 Wegmann 
won the design competition for the ammunition rack based on technical merit, but the 
production contract was awarded to Wegmann, mostly because of its claims of extensive 
proprietary data rights to the rack design.   [Ref. 12] 
When questioned about alternate sources they replied, some domestic manufac- 
turers have experience producing other ammunition storage racks, but estimates indicate 
it would take approximately ten to twelve months to establish a domestic producer. Also, 
if a domestic producer were utilized, the problem of Wegmann' s proprietary data rights 
claim on the technical data package would still exist.  [Ref. 12] 
Evaluation of the Foreign-Sources 
This section first determines if the three foreign-sourced parts of the Ml tank are 
considered critical. Second, using one of the methodologies discussed in Chapter III, it 
can be determined if the continued foreign-source use of these parts poses a threat to the 
continued support of the Ml tank. 
Criticality 
Critical: A part or technology is defined as critical if its absence does not allow 
the weapon systems to perform its intended mission. 
Representatives of the PM's office were asked to determine if the Ml tank could 
conduct its intended mission without the foreign produced optics, ammunition storage 
racks, and microcircuits in the ballistic computer. The PM's office representatives stated 
that these three parts are essential for the operation of the Ml tank's main gun. They 
stated that without any one of these three parts the tank would become significantly less 
effective during combat situations.   [Ref. 13] 
Representatives of the PM's office were asked the following questions to aid in 
the determination of foreign dependence of the three foreign produced parts. 
1. Are there less than four producers of the type of optics used in the Ml 
tank? 
2. Are the producers of these types of optics concentrated in less than four 
countries outside of the U.S.? 
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3.        Do the identified producers of the optics (located outside of the U.S.) 
control over fifty percent of the optic market? 
The above questions were also asked concerning the ammunition storage racks and 
the microcircuits. 
The program office did not have the numbers of the producers for the optics, 
ammunition storage racks or the microcircuits. However, they did provide an explanation 
as to how they mitigate risks associated with foreign-sourcing. 
First, the PM's office prefers that all parts for the Ml tank to be produced within 
the U.S. Parts not produced within the U.S. are by exception only. The optics, 
ammunition storage racks, and the microcircuits are allowed to be produced by foreign- 
sources because of cost reasons. In all three instances, domestic capabilities have been 
assessed and proven to be available but, in most circumstances, at double to triple the cost 
of the foreign produced part.   [Ref. 12] 
If a foreign-source is used, the PM office in conjunction with the prime contractor 
attempt to locate an alternate domestic source. Both the PM's office and the prime 
contractor try not to sole-source any parts of the Ml tank. It has been determined that 
if more than one production source exists, the price of the product is competitive and 
supply security exists.   [Ref. l:p. 12] 
In these three cases of foreign-sourced parts, the PM's office has identified an 
alternate domestic producer. There are also time estimates of how long it will take to 
begin domestic production it the foreign-source is not available. The current estimates 
for domestic producers to begin in these three cases are all within one year.   [Ref. 13] 
Summary 
The PM's office is aware of their responsibilities as outlined in the DoD 
Instruction 5000.2. They have developed plans to provide supply support for the MI 
tank. They have identified foreign-sources through the use of information provided by 
contractual agreements and lists of suppliers provided by the prime contractor. 
The PM's office closely monitors the producers of Government furnished parts and 
materials. They conduct periodic meetings to determine if these producers are on 
schedule and within budget. 
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Currently, the PM's office does not have the resources to conduct in-depth studies 
of foreign dependence, such as those documented in Chapter III. They do however have 
a policy to seek a domestic supply source if a foreign supply source is used. 
The PM's office could not list the number of producers within a single market and 
did not have the knowledge of the market shares for a particular manufacturer. The limit 
of their knowledge did not allow for the application of any of the methodologies listed 
in Chapter III. 
The Prime Contractor 
General Dynamics Land Systems Division (GDLS) is the sole-source developer, 
integrator, and manufacturer of the Ml series tanks. GDLS is a profit-orientated business. 
GDLS does not define critical parts, but does define critical suppliers. GDLS uses the 
following procedures to identify their critical or key suppliers: 
1. Sales to GDLS exceed $500k annually 
2. Source-Controlled or extensive qualification required 
3. Posses Government-owned machinery 
GDLS has identified 121 critical suppliers, three of which are considered foreign. 
These three foreign suppliers are the producers of the optics for the gunner's primary 
sight, the ammunition storage racks, and the microcircuits in the ballistic computer which 
were covered in a previous section of this chapter. 
An investigation was conducted to determine if any of the suppliers for GDLS 
utilized foreign-sources in the production of parts for the Ml tank. It was stated that of 
the 121 critical suppliers, three were considered foreign-sources. GDLS was asked of the 
remaining 118 suppliers, do any of them use foreign-sources for the production of parts 
supplied to GDLS? GDLS did not provide any information concerning the suppliers for 
their subcontractors or parts producers. 
To investigate the foreign influence of suppliers and material producers, certain 
sub-tier producers were interviewed. The methodology was as follows: There are 600 
industrial base suppliers for the Ml series tanks. Of this 600, there are 121 which are 
considered key or critical suppliers. Of the 121 key suppliers, there are 27 unique Ml 
tank vendors.   Unique vendors are sole-source firms within the U.S. that produce a 
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specific part for the Ml series tanks. To focus this investigation further, of the unique 
vendors, there are only a select few which only produce parts for the Ml tank; as opposed 
to those which also produce parts for the Ml, M1A1, M1IP, M1A2, and the M1A2 
Heavy. 
The two firms chosen and the analysis is discussed below. 
Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corporation 
Kearfott is the sole producer of the Ml line of sight unit, the gun trunnion re- 
supplier, and servo drive for the laser range finder of the Ml tank. The primary weapon 
of the Ml tank is the 105 main gun. These parts and components combined make-up the 
fire control system for the main gun of the Ml tank. 
A representative for Kearfott explained their relationship with GDLS. He stated 
that GDLS retains the top level technical data package while Kearfott retains the sub-tier 
manufacturing technical data package. The information that GDLS retains provides a 
general overview of the internal working relationships of the components, such as, how 
the line of sight unit is linked to the gun trunnion resupplier to produce accurate targeting 
of the main gun system. The information within the technical data package retained by 
Kearfott actually reveals how to build the line of sight unit and the gun trunnion 
resupplier. The majority of the components of the fire control system produced by 
Kearfott are produced under their control in North Carolina. However, the gun trunnion 
re-supplier in manufactured in Mexico under their control. The nine circuit cards and 
transistors which also go into the fire control unit are produced off-shore. 
When questioned as to the availability of alternate sources to produce the circuit 
cards and transistors, the representative explained, it is like going to the store to purchase 
an item. There is ample supply and selection everyday of the year. We determine which 
supplier can consistently deliver a standard product and remain with them until problems 
develop. If and when problems develop we effortlessly change suppliers with minimal 
delays. There is a vast inventory of suppliers who could produce the circuit cards and 
transistors. 
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The Leach Corporation 
The interview with a representative of the Leach Corporation revealed that they 
produce only one part for GDLS, a power source. Their knowledge of what this part did 
for the overall effectiveness of the Ml system was lacking. They did however know the 
market level competition for this part was limited. They stated, "Originally there were 
two suppliers of this device. The reliability and effectiveness of the other supplier's 
device proved to be less than ours, allowing Leach to become the sole-source producer." 
Further investigation revealed that Leach, in partnership with the German firm 
LRE Relay and Electronics, actually produce the device. A Leach representative stated 
that the partnership is what provided Leach the expertise to produce the part. 
B.        SUMMARY 
This chapter identified the procedures or lack of procedures that the U.S. Army 
and the prime contractor use in determining critical parts or technologies of the Ml tank. 
It established that the criteria for establishing a part to be critical is different among the 
Program Manager's office and the prime contractor. 
The PM's office indicated that they monitor known foreign-sources and attempt 
to mitigate risks associated with their influences by developing alternate sources. They 
also stated that with their limited resources that they are not capable of conducting in- 
depth analysis of current suppliers. 
The prime contractor has identified foreign-sources at the subcontractor levels. 
The prime contractor did not provide any insight into foreign dependence at the material 
and parts producer levels. 
A limited investigation of parts producers revealed some foreign-source depen- 
dencies. It is concluded, that more knowledge needs to be gained about the sub-tier level 
suppliers. The level of foreign dependence of the Ml tank can not be determined without 
knowing the extent of sub-tier foreign-dependence. 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
The first four chapters of this thesis investigated the different facets of the defense 
industrial base to analyze the extent of foreign-source dependence in the production of the 
Ml tank.  This chapter analyzes the issues discovered in that investigation. 
A.   THE IMPACT OF THE DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGET 
It was discussed in Chapter I that the defense budget is continuing to decline. 
Through interviews with GDLS it was determined that 32% of their critical parts suppliers 
would exit the defense industrial base if tank production dropped below 120 units per 
year. GDLS also noted that a 30% price increase in the Ml tank also would occur at this 
production level.   [Ref. 1] 
Noting production rates and manpower decline, GDLS was asked to identify the 
essential skills which are affected the most by the decline in production. They provided 
the following: 
There are various skills required to fabricate, machine, assemble and test 
the Ml Abrams. GDLS has identified a grouping of skills which maintains 
the "sufficient mass" for continuation of the Ml program. They are as 
follows: 
- Armor Fabrication and Welding 
- Complex Armor and CNC Machining 
- Vehicle Assembly, Integration and Test 
- Optics and Electronics 
- Product Acceptance and Test 
- Production and Supplier Quality Technical Support 
- Procurement Supplier Base and Material Management 
- Process and Product Technical Support 
- Maintenance and Repair 
Most of these skills have few counterparts in the rest of the defense 
industry and virtually none in the commercial industry. 
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As production rates decline each of these skills suffers deterioration 
resulting in loss of product knowledge, flexibility, worker retention, cost 
over[-]runs, inefficiencies and customer support.   [Ref. 1] 
The question is then, if the sole source producer of the Ml tank loses the majority 
of these critical skills, who is going to replace them? It is conceivable that foreign 
producers would replace these domestic suppliers exiting the defense industry. 
Israel, Germany, and the United Kingdom all have viable domestic defense 
industries. They have structured their defense industrial base to meet their individual 
needs. The foreign defense producers have designed a structure for continued defense 
production. They have assigned their defense production to large conglomerates which 
are not solely dependent on defense business. Through this arrangement, these countries 
have been able to maintain a defense industry in spite of fluctuations in defense demand. 
If GDLS does lose several of the skills listed above and the U.S. still requires tank 
parts that these skills produce, it is only logical to assume that one alternative is to 
increase foreign dependence and buy from the countries that have maintained some 
military capability. 
Another important point related to the loss of critical suppliers, is that it is difficult 
to get them to come back to the defense industrial sector once they have left. It was 
noted in Chapter I that private industry is not willing to convert their plants to defense 
production unless there is a Presidential mandate and tremendous public support for the 
war effort, such as was exhibited during WWII. 
Currently, there is no major war and public opinion about the U.S. Army's 
presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Korea, Rwanda, and Somalia is not always supportive. 
The U.S. military has to have equipment to fulfill its mission requirements. If the U.S. 
Army was called upon to conduct a peace mission in any of these four areas for an 
extended period of time, they would require an increase of equipment and supplies. The 
question then would be whether enough of the defense industrial base is left to respond 
for the requested increase. 
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B.   PREDICTED AFFECTS AT THE SOLDIER LEVEL 
To determine the affects of the declining defense industrial base on the soldiers 
in combat, an understanding of the National Security Strategy and latest Industry Sector 
Survey is necessary. The National Security Strategy outlines how much military force is 
currently required and the Industry Sector Survey examines if the industrial base can 
support the requirement. 
A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. February 1995 
states: 
With program enhancements, the forces the administration is fielding will 
be sufficient to help defeat aggression in two nearly simultaneous major 
regional conflicts.   [Ref. 35:p. 9] 
A Major Regional Conflict (MRC) equates to the forces required to win a war the 
magnitude of the Persian Gulf War. The current administration has determined that the 
U.S. military force must be capable of defeating the aggression in two MRCs almost 
simultaneously. A review was conducted to determine the magnitude of military forces 
required to accomplish this task. Once this was accomplished, DoD conducted a defense 
industrial sector survey to determine if the U.S. possessed what was required to meet the 
administration's mandate.   [Ref. 2:p. 6] 
It was determined that the Tank Automotive Command currently cannot support 
the mandated two MRC scenario. They indicated the following short-falls for the Ml 
tank series. 
COMMODITY WAR RESERVE REQUIREMENTS SHORTFALL 
Engines 1,659 1,376 
Transmissions 1,568 869 
Roadwheel Arms 295 288 
Final Drives 992 663 
Track 265,919 88,803 
Roadwheels 8,769 4,038 
Sprockets 8,980 7,161 
Shock Absorbers 204 37 
Torsion Bars 2,066 1,451 
59 
In addition, Donaldson, the only full-service air filter supplier, recently advised the 
Army that they were discontinuing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) filter 
production. Also, Textron Lycoming, the sole producer for the Ml engine, was scheduled 
to cease engine production in March 1995. 
If the U.S. undertakes the mission of conducting two almost simultaneous MRCs, 
many of the previously mentioned parts will not be present in adequate quantities for 
weapon systems support. Using the information provided by the sector survey, the U.S. 
Army will be in need of basic repair parts. 
When repair parts shortages such as those previously mentioned occur, the 
probability of a tank losing its self-propelled capability is increased. If tanks can not 
move by themselves, they are collected and placed within the Unit Level Collection Point 
(UMCP) to await repair. Actions such as this, temporarily reduce the armor fighting force 
on the battlefield. The severity of the repair parts supply shortages will determine the 
number of disabled vehicles and the length of time the vehicle must remain at the UMCP. 
In addition, if an armor company loses more than two vehicles for any reason, they are 
considered combat ineffective.  [Ref. 36:p. 7-32] 
C.       MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN-SOURCE USE 
The Government has a mandate to monitor known foreign-source uses. The PM's 
office for the Ml tank has identified three instances of foreign-source use within the Ml 
program. The prime contractor also monitors most known instances of foreign-source 
uses. They have identified the same three instances of foreign-source use within the Ml 
program. Neither of these two had any information of a foreign-source dependence at the 
sub-tier levels of production for the Ml tank. This lack of knowledge could seriously 
jeopardize the continued success of the Ml tank. 
Interviews with two sub-tier producers for the Ml tank disclosed that there is some 
foreign-sourcing of parts in their production. Without visibility into the extent of foreign- 
sourcing however, the prime contractor has limited ability to mitigate the risks associated 
with foreign-source dependence. 
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Additionally, the fact that the PM's office had no knowledge of sub-tier foreign 
use is alarming and dangerous.   It is alarming, because it displays a lack of concern by 
DoD to monitor who is producing what for the defense systems of the Nation.   It is 
dangerous, because unbeknownst to DoD, the actions in one particular region of the world 
may have a dramatic impact to the continued supply of parts for a major component of 
the key weapon systems in the military.  The following is an example of an unpredicted 
action which happened that could have had an affect on most weapon systems in the U.S. 
Army: 
.... a process known as Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD). CVD is a 
state-of-the-art process used in the production of some DoD-critical 
semiconductors, such as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC's). 
The U.S. leads the world in CVD technology, with domestic firms owning 
a 75 percent share of the world market for CVD equipment. A critical 
step in the CVD process involves ozone being bubbled through several 
liquified chemical elements before being deposited on the silicon wafer 
surface. The ozone used is generated commercially. The only source of 
ozone in the world is in Kobe, Japan. On January 17, 1995, the city of 
Kobe Japan was devastated by a major earthquake. The earthquake was 
the second worst in Japan's history, destroying 88,000 buildings. 
Fortunately, the ozone production facility was not damaged, but much of 
the city's harbor, Japan's largest, was severely damaged and the flow of 
goods out of the city was constrained.   [Ref. 34:p. 108] 
This example raises the following questions: Do the ASICs within the Ml tank 
need ozone? Do the PM's office and the prime contractor consider the need for ozone 
a critical foreign dependency? What special considerations should be identified within 
other parts of the Ml tank. 
The lack of knowledge of where the sub-tier suppliers get their resources is critical 
and needs to be determined. To continue to depend on sub-tier production without this 
knowledge is dangerous. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary and subsidiary research questions are examined and conclusions 
presented in this chapter.  In addition, recommendations for future actions are offered. 
A. EXTENT OF GLOBALIZATION OF FOREIGN PRODUCERS 
1. Conclusions 
There is no solid way to measure the extent of the Ml tank's dependence on 
foreign-sources. The overall extent of foreign-sourcing and foreign dependency and their 
significance to Ml production are unknown because, the program office has only limited 
information on foreign-sources of supply at lower tiers of the supplier base. No criteria 
have been established for determining what levels of foreign dependence tolerance should 
be for the Ml tank and what actions the program office should take to reduce the 
associated risks. 
2. Recommendations 
All parts within the U.S. Army inventory possess a National stock number. It is 
recommended that the U.S. Army form a data base using the National stock numbers of 
the parts for the Ml tank. A portion of the National stock number could be reserved for 
use to designate the parts producer. When the manufacturer produces the part he could 
stamp his producer's identification number along with the National stock number. 
Utilizing this simple procedure would allow any one with a listing to determine the 
manufacturer of any part produced for the Ml tank. 
B. DETERMINATION OF LEVELS OF THREAT 
1. Conclusions 
The Program Manager of the Ml tank has little awareness of the extent of foreign- 
sourcing or dependency in their weapon systems, particularly beyond the prime contractor 
and their immediate subcontractors. Additionally, DoD has not provided the U.S. Army 
with any guidelines to accurately determine unacceptable levels of foreign dependency. 
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2. Recommendations 
The program manager needs to establish guidelines of acceptable levels of foreign 
dependence.  The studies listed within this thesis provided four such methodologies. 
C. CAUSES OF SUPPLY DISRUPTION 
1. Conclusions 
The number one reason documented for the use of foreign-sources was price. The 
PM's office, the prime contractor, and the material producers all use foreign-sources 
because of price. 
Also, the current DoD budget projections indicate the defense budget to continue 
to be reduced. GDLS, recognizing this fact, has informed the Government that more than 
32% of their critical suppliers would leave the defense industrial base if continued 
reductions occur in tank production. 
The mass exodus of 32% of critical domestic suppliers from the defense industrial 
base will provide an increased opportunity for foreign producers to enter the market. 
2. Recommendations 
Allow foreign producers to enter the defense industrial base, but require them to 
conduct all manufacturing and production efforts within the continental borders of the 
U.S. 
If the U.S. has a requirement for a substantial number of defense weapon systems 
and the current private sector will not support the required production, there is no one else 
available to produce them but foreign-sources. Allowing foreign-owned firms to operate 
within the U.S. has provided continued support for several domestic markets, such as, the 
automobile market. 
D. PLANS TO MITIGATE RISK 
1. Conclusions 
Current plans to mitigate risk revealed by the PM's office are reactionary. The 
PM's office monitors the supply of Government furnished parts and deliverables from the 
prime contractor. This approach is inefficient and of limited effectiveness. It offers only 
a little insight into foreign dependencies at the subcomponent level.    It is at the 
64 
subcomponent level that the majority of the current globalization of production is 
occurring. 
2. Recommendations 
The PM's office needs to continuously investigate all levels of production within 
their weapon systems. Only a continuous thorough monitoring of all levels of production 
will provide information worthy of identifying notable trends within the defense industrial 
base. By identifying trends, the PM's office will be enabled to formulate long range 
plans, support ailing contractors, and discover growing foreign dependencies. 
E.        MONITORING OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES GLOBALIZATION 
1. Conclusions 
Historically, the Pentagon and other Government agencies have been trying to 
collect and analyze defense industrial data systematically, but these efforts have been 
sporadic. The four studies listed in Chapter III are good examples of DoD's efforts to 
determine the extent of foreign influence on the defense industrial base. It should be 
noted that these studies used different methodologies and drew different conclusions about 
different areas of the industrial base. The studies were also conducted in different years. 
But in lieu of these short-comings, these studies constitute the majority of the current 
evidence of the globalization of the defense industrial base. 
Reliance on ad hoc data collection, puts DoD and the U.S. Army Armor force in 
a reactive role and limits their ability to identify trends in critical industrial sectors. 
2. Recommendations 
Adequately staff and resource the PM's office to conduct studies within their own 
specialties. The PM is currently responsible to insure production and support of the 
weapon systems. His organization presently retains more information concerning the 
specific weapon systems than another agency in DoD. All the PM needs is to conduct 
continuous in-depth analysis of the producers within his weapon systems production 
structure. 
It would appear to be much more cost effective to provide a little more continuous 
information to one agency than to totally educate an ad hoc investigative committee, that 
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will only take a snapshot view of the systems production structure. The benefits from 
providing continuous information would allow the PM to formulate plans instead of 
causing a crisis by overtly reacting to a snapshot study. 
F.        RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although many studies have been conducted in an attempt to determine the extent 
of foreign dependency of the defense industrial base, there are many areas of research that 
could be beneficial to the acquisition community. The following areas for further research 
are recommended: 
A cost-benefit analysis of the studies conducted to determine foreign 
dependence of defense industrial base. 
Investigate to determine which foreign defense producers are seeking to 
expand into the U.S. defense market. 
The examination of the Buy American Act to determine its contribution to 
the life cycle costs of the weapon systems. 
66 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Telephone interview with Mr. Keating, Information Manager for General 
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 13 March 1995. 
2. Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles Industry Sector Survey, prepared by the, American 
Defense Preparedness Association and The Production Management Division 
(AMSTA-AQ-C), October 1994, p. 15. 
3. United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 
on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee, U.S Congress, 
Industrial Base Significance of DoD's Foreign Dependence. January 1991, p. 2. 
4. Building a Competitive America (Washington, DC: Competitiveness Policy 
Council, March 1, 1992), p. 13. 
5. Lawrence, Robert, L., "Balance of Payments," The Fortune Encyclopedia of 
Economics. Warner Books, Inc., New York, NY, 1993, p. 517. 
6. "National Saving and International Investment," in B. Douglas Bernheim and John 
B. Shoven, eds., National Saving and Economic Performance (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), 1991, pp. 201-26. 
7. Aspin, Les, "The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For A New Era," GPO: September 
1, 1993, p. 1. 
8. Theodore H. Moran, American Economic Policy and National Security. Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, New York, NY, 1992, pp. 8-9. 
9. Gansler, J.S., Affording Defense. The MIT Press Cambridge, MA, 1989, p. 240. 
10. U.S. Congress, Defense Industrial Panel, The Ailing Defense Industrial Base: 
Unready for Crisis. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, DC: GPO, 
December 31, 1980), p. 8. 
11. Arnavas, Donald, P. and William, J., Ruberry, Government Contract Guidebook. 
Federal Publications Inc., Washington DC, 1987, p. 22-3. 
12. Telephone interview with Major Don Miller, Acquisition Support Division, Army 
Material Command, February 14, 1995. 
13. Telephone interview with Major Don Miller, Acquisition Support Division, Army 
Material Command, February 17, 1995. 
67 
14. Heginbotham, Erland, H., Dependence of U.S. Defense Systems On Foreign 
Technologies, (Institute for Defense Analyses) IDA Paper P-2326, December 1990, 
p. 10. 
15. Eston, White, T., Natural and Energy Resources, National Security Management 
Series, Washington, DC: National Security Management Series, 1985, p. 11. 
16. Milward, Alan, S., War, Economy and Society. 1939-1945. Berkeley and Los 
Angles:  University of California Press, 1977, p. 49. 
17. Joint Logistics Review Board, Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era. Monograph 
12. Logistics Planning. Washington, DC:  GPO, 1970. 
18. Lincoln, George, A., Economics of National Security. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1954. 
19. U.S. Congress, House, Committee On Armed Services, Capability of U.S. Defense 
Industrial Base. 96th Congress, 2nd Session, September 17 - December 3, 1980. 
20. Gansler, J. S., Affording Defense. The NIT Press Cambridge, MA, 1991. 
21. Draft 1994 National Military Strategy. GPO, 1994. 
22. National Military Strategy of The United States. GPO, January 1992. 
23. Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies and Procedures. February 23, 1991, pp. 5-E-l,2. 
24. U.S. General Accounting Office, Industrial Base: Significance of DoD's Foreign 
Dependence. Report Number NSIAD 94-104, 1994, pp. 24-25. 
25. Information - info@tasc.com, WWW Administration - www@tasc.com, Copyright 
1994 TASC, Inc.,  All rights reserved. 
26. Washington Information Directory 1994-1995. Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
Washington DC, 1993, p. 583. 
68 
27. Heginbotham, Erland, H. Dependence of U.S. Defense Systems on Foreign 
Technologies. Institute For Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, December 1990, 
pp. S-l, 58. 
28. Libicki, Martin, U.S. Industrial Base Dependence /Vulnerability. Mobilization 
Concepts Development Center Institute For National Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University, November 1987, p. iv. 
29. Moran, American Economic Policy and National Security, pp. 99. 
30. Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces For a New 
Era. GPO, September 1, 1993. 
31. Telephone interview with CW3 Richard Makola, Maintenance Technician, 1-67 
Armor, Fort Hood, TX, 3 December 1995. 
32. Owen, Wally, Lieutenant Commander United States Navy, "Systems Acquisition 
and Program Management MN3301" Handouts and Views, March 1993. 
34. Pena, Sergio, Evaluating Foreign-Source Dependencies in U.S. Army Missile 
System Production. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
March 1995, p. 108. 
35. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, 
February 1995, p. 9. 
36. HQ Department of the Army, United States Armv Field Manual 71-2. 27 
December 1988, p. 7-32. 
69 
70 
